Understanding the US-Saudi Nuclear Deal: Safety and Proliferation Concerns

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The recent accord between the Trump administration and Saudi Arabia could open doors for the transfer of U.S. nuclear technology to the kingdom. Although the specifics of the nuclear agreement remain under wraps, scholars from the Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP) offer insights into its potential impact on Saudi Arabia, the Middle East, the U.S., and global nuclear proliferation.

US Participation in Saudi Nuclear Program

Ashley Finan: Comparing U.S. involvement in Saudi Arabia's nuclear program to alternatives like China, Russia, France, or South Korea could reveal significant differences in global nuclear safety and proliferation. A Section 123 Agreement, similar to the one with Saudi Arabia, sets binding conditions under the Atomic Energy Act, including IAEA safeguards and U.S. consent rights over enrichment involving U.S.-origin materials. These measures ensure ongoing U.S. oversight and influence, potentially stronger than other supplier options.

Such nuclear agreements foster long-term institutional relationships, offering continuous U.S. visibility and potential for influence. However, without an Additional Protocol, the IAEA's ability to investigate undeclared activities is limited. Moreover, Saudi Arabia could pursue enrichment through non-U.S.-supplied pathways, provided it adheres to NPT and IAEA obligations.

Economic Implications for US Companies

Ashley Finan: While a Section 123 Agreement does not guarantee construction or financing, it provides a legal framework for Saudi Arabia to proceed with nuclear power development. The kingdom must still choose technology, establish ownership, and secure financing, potentially involving the U.S. as a partner. The agreement could favor U.S. suppliers such as Westinghouse, yet a reactor award remains unconfirmed.

The arrangement might enhance U.S. vendor prospects by embedding nuclear trade within a government-to-government framework. Nonetheless, success relies on Saudi decisions and project execution, with past experiences in the U.S., China, and UAE emphasizing the need for effective project management and risk mitigation.

Impact on Middle East Nuclear Proliferation

Richard Nephew: The agreement's text is currently unavailable, leaving its contents speculative. Reports suggest an initial U.S.-Saudi study on the economics of Saudi nuclear fuel production. Should the study yield positive results, the U.S. may relax its stance on Saudi enrichment, imposing conditions like U.S. inspections and technology safeguards to restrict weaponization, although these may not fully prevent a future nuclear weapon pursuit.

The U.S.'s previous insistence on countries renouncing sensitive nuclear activities for cooperation has faced resistance, with nations valuing nuclear technology rights and economic independence. While changes in this policy could lead to regional nuclear arms pursuits, past revelations about A. Q. Khan’s nuclear technology sales underline the risks. The U.S. has efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, but shifting policies may have unintended consequences.

Even with Saudi Arabia's record, setting a precedent for less stringent nuclear agreements could lead to misuse. Historical instances, such as North Korea's involvement in Syria, highlight potential dangers. It remains critical for any agreement to ensure robust preventive measures.